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Few writers have been both praised and condemned for the wrong r ea -
sons more than Henry Adams, mainly because his pessimistic philosophy 
very easily provokes emotional arguments either for or against it. A num-
ber of critics who are usually well balanced seem to assume an extreme 
position when they are discussing Adams. Consider, for example, the e s -
says on Adams by Yvor Winters in his The Anatomy of Nonsense (1943) and 
by Professor Robert E. Spiller first published in Saturday Review of Liter-
ature (February 22, 1947) and reprinted as part of his chapter on Adams in 
the Literary History of the United States (Macmillan, 1948).1 
Winters in particular characteristically adopts an Olympian attitude 
in disparaging his victim with such phrases as ,Tchildish mentality'f applied 
to all Adams's works except the History of the United States During the Ad-
ministrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. To consider a spe-
cific instance, Winters finds a "certain iridescence of emotional surfacebut 
precisely nothing of sanity" in the famous passage in the Education in which 
Adams can find only disillusionment in the study of psychology as a possible 
source of unity. In his lifelong search for unity for the individual, Adams 
had at last come wearily to investigate psychology only to discover 
that the psychologists had, in a few cases, distinguished 
several personalities in the same mind, each conscious and 
constant, individual and exclusive . . . . To his mind, the 
compound . . . took at once the form of a bicycle rider, 
mechanically balancing himself by inhibiting all his inferior 
personalities, and sure to fall into the subconscious chaos 
below, if one of his inferior personalities got on top . . . . 
The mind, like the body, kept its unity unless it hap-
pened to lose its balance, and the professor of physics, who 
slipped on a pavement and hurt himself, knew no more than 
an idiot what knocked him down, though he did know - - what 
the idiot could hardly do — that his normal condition was 
idiocy, or want of balance, and that his sanity was unstable 
artifice. His normal thought was dispersion, sleep, dream, 
inconsequence . . . . 
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By that path of newest science, one saw no unity ahead 
— nothing but a dissolving mind. 
Now, in Winters' opinion, "mechanically" here is synonymous with "by a 
base and contemptible trick, " and since Adams speaks of the balance as 
artificial and of chaos as the only absolute truth, he means, according to 
Winters, that "one might as well immerse oneself in it [the chaos] as soon 
as possible. " In other words, Adams's morality "aims at loss of balance." 
But certainly this is a strained interpretation of Adams's pessimistic lan-
guage. In the first place, it must be remembered here that in this passage 
Adams is merely reporting that in his search for unity he could find no a s -
sistance from the outstanding contemporary psychologists. That he may 
have overstressed the degree to which chaos rather than unity for the indi-
vidual mind is implied in their writings is beside the point; the point is 
whether or not Adams's interpretation of what he thought they meant indi-
cated that his own philosophy and even, as Winters would have it, his mo-
rality "aimed at loss of balance." It seems to me that even St. Thomas 
Aquinas, for example, whose account of the mind or soul Winters (though 
not a Thomist, not even a Christian) thinks is the most satisfactory that has 
been given, would have found no basic disagreement with Adams's (of the 
modern psychologist's) description of the fragility of the human mind. The 
inferior personalities and the subconscious chaos St. Thomas would have 
called the Devil, against which the sane mind (by the help of God's grace of 
course) must struggle. To be sure, Adams lacked the steadying influence 
of St. Thomas's God, but so, by his own admission, does Winters. Without 
such assistance, then, man must make his own order, and certainly no one 
else tried harder than Adams, from whom Winters himself (rather contra-
dictorily since he accuses Adams of "aiming at loss of balance") quotes 
several passages like the following: 
From cradle to grave this problem of running order through 
chaos, direction through space, discipline through freedom, 
unity through multiplicity, has always been, and must always 
be, the task of education. 
But Adams could never have agreed with Winters that one can believe 
something merely because such a belief seems best adapted to preserving 
or increasing his mental welfare. "The philosophical problem, as I see it," 
says Winters, 
is to keep as scientific, as Aristotelian, an eye as possible 
upon the conditions of our life as we actually find ourselves 
forced to live it, so that we may not make the mistake of 
choosing a mystery which shall, in proportion as it influ-
ences our actions, violate these conditions and lead to dis-
aster. For example, a strictly deterministic philosophy 
. . . can lead only toward automatism in action, and auto-
matism is madness. And similarly, a strictly nominalistic 
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view of the universe can lead only to the confusion and para l -
ysis reached by Adams . . . . If we find that a theory vio-
lates our nature, we have then learned something about our 
nature; and we have learned that there is something wrong 
with the theory. 
This reasoning of Winters, Adams would surely have said, sounds danger-
ously like the pragmatism of William James as applied to belief: we believe 
something because TTit links things satisfactorily. M The whole function of 
philosophy, M said James, 
ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make 
to you and me at definite instants in our life, if this world-
formula or that world-formula be the true one. 
And of course the choice of a world-formula should be determined by this 
"definite difference, M provided, James adds, we manage to "assimilate the 
novel in our experience to our beliefs in stock. M In this way, says James 
in the concluding sentence of his essay entitled "What Pragmatism Means, " 
the conclusions of pragmatism "will be as friendly as those of Mother Na-
t u r e . " 2 
Although Adams (with considerable justification) would have scorned 
this kind of argument, he did try very hard to find for himself the emotional 
unity experienced by believers in the thirteenth century, but his skeptical 
mind interfered with an emotional faith and found far too many rational flaws 
in the intellectualized faith of scholastic philosophy. An extremely devas-
tating analysis of medieval philosophy is his chapter on Abëlard and William 
of Champeaux in Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres, in which, reporting an 
imaginary extension of a debate between the two, he proves with flawless 
logic that nominalism, if logically extended far enough, always leads to 
materialism and that realism, if similarly extended, always leads to pan-
theism — chaos, then, in the very stronghold of unity. "Narrow and dan-
gerous, " he says, "was the border-line always between pantheism and 
materialism, and the chief interest of the schools was in finding fault with 
each other's paths. " There was chaos even in St. Thomas's great Church 
Intellectual, which Winters praises so highly, but never more definitely 
than to say that it "steadied the thought of the period with a little of that 
r a res t form of profundity curiously called common sense. " Why, then, 
does not Winters specifically point out the common sense profundity in the 
following and other fundamental tenets of St. Thomas in which Adams found 
such grave logical difficulties ? 
Abèlard's question [says Adams] still remained to be an-
swered. How did Socrates differ from Plato — Judas from 
John . . . . Were they, in fact, two, or one? What made 
an individual? . . . The abstract form or soul which existed 
as a possibility in God, from all time —was it one or many? 
To the Church, this issue overshadowed all else, for, if 
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humanity was one and not multiple, the Church which dealt 
only with individuals, was lost. To the schools, also, the 
issue was vital, for, if the soul or form was already multi-
ple from the first, unity was lost; the ultimate substance 
and prime motor itself became multiple; the whole issue was 
reopened . . . . Thomas Aquinas was not so happily placed, 
between the Church and the schools . . . Thomas asserted 
that the soul was measured by matter . . . and suggested 
that the body's form might take permanence from the matter 
to which it gave form. That matter should invididualize mind 
was itself a violent wrench of logic, but that it should also 
give permanence — the one quality it did not possess — to 
this individual mind seemed to many learned doctors a scan-
dal. 
Also on the point of man's free will, Adams reasoned thus: if God was, as 
St. Thomas contended, "the sole and immediate cause and support of every-
thing in His creation, " then this fact, which St. Thomas ignored, must fol-
low: 
God was also the cause of its defects, and could not — being 
Justice and Goodness in essence — hold man responsible for 
His [God's] own omissions. Still less could the State or 
Church do it in His name . . . . He wills that some things 
shall be contingent and others necessary, but He wills in the 
same act that the contingency shall be necessary . . . . In 
the same way He wills that His creation shall develop itself 
in time and space and sequence, but He creates these condi-
tions as well as the events. 
If Adams found these and many more logically irreconcilable difficul-
ties in medieval theology, he found still more in modern theology, which he 
considered worse than none at all, and he would have scorned a "common 
sense" theory like that of Winters which determines truth by what it prom-
ises toward insuring our sanity. Adams was an honest and a fearless 
thinker, and he saw no honest reason for asserting that the truth about the 
universe is necessarily adapted to preserving or increasing our sanity; 
sanity, he had decided, must dispense with such magical assistance, how-
ever precarious the balance may be in even the healthiest of us. 
Winters apologizes for the elaboration of his argument but explains 
that he feels it necessary because 
my acquaintance with the minds of my literary contempora-
r ies is extensive, and I am sure that many of them derive an 
important part of their thought from Adams, though many of 
them do not know it; and to my great regret I have found that 
many of the most brilliant of them understand simple matters 
only with the greatest of difficulty. 
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To elucidate these simple matters that his brilliant contemporaries can 
understand only with the greatest of difficulty. Winters feels it necessary 
throughout his argument not to spare the cudgel. To consider another 
example, he scorns as trivial the difficulties that Adams found in the theo-
r ies of Darwin and Lyell as another approach toward unity. Winters admits 
that his own knowledge of biology is slight but says that even an elementary 
knowledge of the subject would have removed these difficulties for Adams. 
Winters ignores or is unaware of the fact that Lyell had Adams write the 
introduction for the American edition of The Principles of Geology and was 
well satisfied with Adams's writing, which contained a sharp reference to 
one of the difficulties scorned as trivial by Winters. Also, and far more 
important, two of the three points which Adams raised in his Education are 
precisely the difficulties which Darwin himself in The Origin of Species ad-
mitted as seriously valid for an adverse criticism of his theory. Winters 
says that Adams need not have been disturbed by the presence of nothing 
higher than shellfish in the Cambrian period, because, to quote Winters, 
,!the shellfish, Mollusca and Arthropoda, represent the two phyla most 
highly developed before the chordates." Of course, but Adams's point was 
that there should be forms intermediate between the shellfish and chordates 
to prove the gradual, minute-variation, uniformitarian ascent proposed by 
Darwin. As Adams says: 
When the vertebrate vanished in Siluria, it disappeared in-
stantly and forever Neither vertebra nor scale nor print 
reappeared, nor any trace of ascent or descent to a lower 
type. The vertebrate began in the Ludlow shale, as com-
plete as Adams himself — in some respects more so — at 
the top of the column of organic evolution: and geology of-
fered no sort of proof that he had ever been anything else. 
The following sentence from The Origin of Species indicates that Darwin 
himself found this difficulty important: 
The several difficulties here discussed, namely — that, 
though we find in our geological formations many links 
between the species which now exist and which formerly 
existed, we do not find infinitely numerous fine transitional 
forms closely joining them all together; — the sudden man-
ner in which several groups of species first appear in our 
European formations; — the almost entire absence, as at 
present known, of formations rich in fossils beneath the 
Cambrian strata, — are all undoubtedly of the most se r i -
ous nature. 3 
In the latter part of this statement Darwin has admitted the seriousness of 
another problem that disturbed Adams and is considered trivial by Winters 
— the fact that in the pre-Cambrian epochs there was at that time abso-
lutely no trace of organic existence. Again Darwin says: 
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. . . the difficulty of assigning any good reason for the 
absence of vast piles of strata rich in fossils beneath the 
Cambrian system is very great . . . . The case at p res -
ent must remain inexplicable, and may be truly urged as a 
valid argument against the views here entertained. (253, 254) 
Since Adams is telling what his views were about the time or a few years 
after The Origin of Species appeared, the fact that later discoveries have 
largely removed these difficulties certainly does not prove that he anymore 
than Darwin was nwitty rather than intelligent" in being disturbed by them at 
that time. 
Winters, too, finds Adams's judgment of ar t vitiated by a thorough-
going relativism. According to Winters, Adams insists throughout Mont-
Saint-Michel and Chartres that the judgment of ar t must be wholly relative. 
"He prefers the older tower of Chartres cathedral to the later, M says Win-
ters , "and as far as one can judge from the photographs the preference is 
certainly sound; but he cannot defend the preference. " The fact is that 
Adams gives two full pages of expert analysis defending his preference for 
the older tower, though he admits that some eminent crit ics have preferred 
the newer. "Of course, " says Adams, 
one sees that the lines of the new tower are not clean, like 
those of the old; the devices that cover the transition from 
the squares to the octagon are rather too obvious; the pro-
portion of the flèche to the tower quite alters the values of 
the parts . . . . There can be no harm in admitting that 
the new tower is a little wanting in repose for a tower whose 
business is to counterpose the very classic lines of the old 
one . . . . The new tower has many faults, but it has great 
beauties, as you can prove by comparing it with other late 
Gothic spires, including those of Viollet-le-Duc. Its chief 
fault is to be where it is . As a companion to the crusades 
and to Saint Bernard, it lacks austerity. As a companion to 
the Virgin of Chartres, it recalls Diane de Poitiers. 
The res t of the two-page discussion of the two towers contains cr i t i -
cism quite as acute and judicial as this, and the same competence is to be 
found in the whole book in the various fields of art, architecture, philoso-
phy, religion and politics. The whole point of the matter is that it is not 
Adams but Winters who is confused. Adams finds confusion, but he cer -
tainly does not create it. The chaos, if we may believe a very respectable 
and serious group of philosophers from Heraclitus to Sartre, may be in the 
nature of things. Winters of course can legitimately argue against this phi-
losophy, but as a critic who emphasizes rational understanding he should 
understand that many intelligent men (including Adams, who lived to be 
eighty and remained a serious scholar, mentally alert, to the very last) 
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have believed in cosmic chaos without suffering any damage to their normal 
activities or their mental processes. 
Winters' chaotic understanding of the philosophy of chaos is shared by 
Professor R. E. Spiller, who speaks of TfAdams' creation of an arbitrary 
cosmology for his purposes." Like Winters, Professor Spiller apparently 
cannot understand that Adams was merely following out very carefully in his 
theory the logical implications of the best scientific thought of his day. P ro -
fessor Spiller admits on one page that ffThe choice of the second law of 
thermodynamics, the law of dissipation of energy, as the needed formula, 
was dictated by the stage to which physical science had developed by 1910.M 
He admits this and yet on the very next page condemns the logic of Adams's 
theory in the following curious criticism: 
These two hypotheses [unity for the Middle Ages and multi-
plicity or chaos for the modern world] are complementary 
when treated in purely intellectual terms, but they present 
a fundamental inconsistency when viewed in the light of emo-
tion. Adams thus also creates, perhaps unwittingly, a 
dichotomy between intellect and emotion which supplies the 
pattern for his art form, but which destroys the validity of 
his theory as an instrument for the logical explanation of the 
universe. 
Professor Spiller apparently means here that from the artistic standpoint 
the hypothesis of unity for the Middle Ages and that of multiplicity or chaos 
for the modern world make an artistically polarized combination, but that 
the loss of unity in modern times is emotionally distressing — the artist is 
adversely affected by his own creation — and hence the dichotomy between 
the intellectual (artistic) unity and the emotional dispersion in suffering. 
But emotional suffering because of a certain explanation of the universe 
does not necessarily mean that this explanation was made emotionally and 
therefore illogically. Unless one has the fortitude of a Spinoza, he may 
suffer as a result of his very soundly intellectual and rational understand-
ing of the truth if the truth seems to be tragic. But more of this point later. 
Though Spiller, like Winters, makes no qualification in his total con-
demnation of Adams's theory "as an instrument for the logical explanation 
of the universe, " yet, unlike Winters, Spiller feels that Adams (though fail-
ing for the universe) attained for himself a personal (semireligious) philo-
sophical unity (a kind of Bergsonian exaltation of intuition) through his vast 
studies in unity and multiplicity, especially through his study of the Virgin. 
The truth which Adams recognizes [says Professor Spiller] 
is that unity may be achieved through emotion even when de-
nied by reason . . . . She [the Virgin] could put in terms 
of positive symbolism what the hooded figure in Rock Creek 
could only permit by reflection. This is what Adams had 
learned from the American woman, but he had to trace it 
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back to twelfth-century France to find it unembarrassed and 
whole. Intuition is above reason; love may triumph over 
logic; ar t can speak deeper truths than science. 
There are two fundamental e r rors in these remarks: (1) That love can t r i -
umph over logic was certainly a belief of the Virgin's worshippers in the 
Middle Ages, but Adams says that for himself and for most moderns the 
power of the Virgin and religious faith in general is dead. For example, in 
Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres he says, sadly but positively: 
For seven hundred years Chartres has seen pilgrims, com-
ing and going more or less like us, and will perhaps see 
them for another seven hundred years; but we shall see it 
no more, and can safely leave the Virgin in her majesty, 
with her three great prophets on either hand, as calm and 
confident in their own strength and in God's providence as 
they were when Saint Louis was born, but looking down from 
a deserted heaven, into an empty church, on a dead faith. 
In his introduction to Adams's novel Esther, Professor Spiller quotes the 
following passage from the Education as evidence of what Adams had learned 
from the Virgin and believed about her: 
He [Adams] never doubted her force, since he felt it to the 
last fibre ôf his being, and could no more dispute its mas -
tery than he could dispute the force of gravitation of which 
he knew nothing but the formula. 4 
But Professor Spiller does not notice that just two pages beyond this pas-
sage, when Adams read that M. de Plehve had been assassinated at St. 
Petersburg, he was stunned by 
this scandalous failure of her Grace [that of the Virgin 
Mary]. To what purpose had she existed, if, after nineteen 
hundred years, the world was bloodier than when she was 
born? The stupendous failure of Christianity tortured h is -
tory. The effort for Unity could not be a partial success; 
even alternating Unity resolved itself into meaningless mo-
tion at last . . . . The old formulas had failed, and a new 
one had to be made . . . . Therefore, when the fogs and 
frost stopped his slaughter of the centuries . . . he sat down 
as though he were again a boy at school to shape after his 
own needs the values of a Dynamic Theory of History. 
And (2) as for the hooded figure in Rock Creek, it is true that Adams at one 
time gave it as a title "the peace of God," but this seems to have meant only 
a stoical resignation, not a religious hope, because he specifically told St. 
Gaudens that he wished the figure to symbolize "the acceptance, intellectu-
ally, of the inevitable. " 5 It is certainly hard to see how an intellectual ac-
ceptance of the inevitable can be interpreted by Professor Spiller to mean 
that, in Adams's opinion, "intuition is above reason; love may triumph over 
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logic; art can speak deeper truths than science." Professor Spiller goes 
on to say that Adams "was not alone on these pilgrimages to Rock Creek 
. . . . His tragedy had become his secret index to the mystery of life and 
death. " But how could"it be jsuch an index when Adams said specifically (in 
a letter quoted by Càtèr) that the figure was meant "to ask a question not to 
give an answer; arid the rnart who answers will be damned to eternity like 
the men who answered the Sphinx"? (610) 
The truth seem» to be that Professor Spiller, starting out from his 
perfectly valid comments about the artistic unity of Chartres and Education, 
is trying to read into Adams's conclusions in these books some additional 
philosophical unity, for which Adams was indeed looking but which was the 
exact opposite of what he found* That Professor Spiller falls into such a 
misinterpretation as I have attributed to him is further indicated when he 
says that AdamsTs quest for a scientific formula to explain the nature of the 
universe was 
as romantic as those of Ahab for Moby Dick or Parsifal for 
the Holy Grail. As in those cases, it became a search for 
the symbol of the life force, an effort to wrest the meaning 
of man from a reluctant nature by sheer violence. The dis-
covery of a new and scientific basis for history would mean 
the creation of a new religion. 
I have carefully searched Adams's writings to find where Spiller gets this 
curious idea about Àdains's romantic hope, but I cannot find it. What I find, 
for example, in the chapter, entitled "A Dynamic Theory of History," is this: 
The influx of new force was nearly spontaneous. The reac -
tion of mind on the mass of nature seemed not greater than 
that of a comet on the sun . . . the idea that new force must 
be in itself a good is only an animal or vegetable instinct. 
As Nature developed her hidden energies, they tended to be-
come destructive. Thought itself became tortured, suffer-
ing reluctantly impatiently, painfully, the coercion of new 
method . „ : as the mind of man enlarged its range, it en-
larged the field of complexity, and must continue to do so, 
even into chaos, until the reservoirs of sensuous or super-
sensuous energies are exhausted, or cease to affect him, or 
until he succumbs to their excess . . . . This, then, or 
something like this, would be a dynamic theory of history. 
And the same i$ true of Adams's attitude toward the dynamo, about 
which Professor Spiller writes, somewhat glowingly, as follows: "Adams, 
in the high excitement ôf discovery, chose the dynamo as a central symbol 
of modern civilization* ; . . . Here was the outward image of his second 
kind of force, almost Specific enough to excite worship if worship were 
due." But Professor'Spiller doeà not detect the weary irony in Adams's 
reference to this terrifying object, before which one was almost inclined to 
12 Midcontinent American Studies Journal 
fall down and worship. If one should worship, Adams implies, it would be 
for the same reason that early man propitiated the gods, whose chaotic 
power to destroy him he feared. "For Adams's objects, M says Adams of 
the dynamo, 
its value lay chiefly in the occult mechanism. Between the 
dynamo in the gallery of machines and the engine-house out-
side, the break of continuity amounted to abysmal fracture 
for a historian's objects. No more relation could he dis-
cover between the steam and the electric current than be-
tween the Cross and the cathedral . . . . Langley could not 
help him. Indeed, Langley seemed to be worried by the 
same trouble, for he constantly repeated that the new forces 
were anarchical, and specially that he was not responsible 
for the new rays, that were little short of parricidal in their 
wicked spirit towards science . . . . In these seven years 
man had translated himself into a new universe, which had 
no common scale of measurement with the old. He had en-
tered a supersensual world, in which he could measure noth-
ing except by chance collisions of movements imperceptible 
to his senses, perhaps even imperceptible to his instruments, 
but perceptible to each other, and so to some known ray at 
the end of the scale. 
And so I can only conclude that Professor Spiller is in er ror when he 
says that, in Adams's opinion, "love may triumph over logic, " and that 
Adams's quest for truth was as "romantic" as that of Parsifal for the Holy 
Grail. Adams was far more like his spiritual descendents of the twentieth 
century, the atheistic existentialists Sartre and Camus and their followers 
for whom the condition of the universe and the fate of its inhabitants can 
only be described as tragically Absurd. Winters is certainly right in saying 
that Adams did not find Unity for himself or for the universe, but Winters 
was certainly not justified in calling Adams's arguments foolish or intellec-
tually less valid than the opposing view. Indeed, if we discount the obviously 
erroneous timing of his dire predictions in "The Law of Acceleration, " the 
basic part of Adams's explanation of the universe has by no means been dis-
proved. According to Wasser, for example, the best judgment about the 
second law of thermodynamics, the law of dissipation of energy (as recently 
as 1956, and there is no evidence of a change since then), was as follows: 
"The most recent physics has not found the second law of thermodynamics 
untenable; it has emphasized that the law might hold true of a closed uni-
verse, but that it has by no means been ascertained whether the universe 
is closed or open. "^ So although we hope that Adams was wrong, it seems 
that there is a definite possibility that he may have been right; indeed the 
destructive forces revealed in the atom and hydrogen bombs and the evi-
dence (accepted now by many astronomers) of an expanding (sometimes 
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called exploding) universe (with no evidence of a compensating contraction) 
might well support AdamsTs general theory of eventual cosmic dispersion 
and chaos. And if his theory should prove to be true physically, he certainly 
accumulated a vast amount of evidence indicating that it might include the 
degradation of psychical and social as well as physical energy — for exam-
ple, the decline of rural population, the multiplication of suicides, and the 
increase of nervous exhaustion, insanity, alcoholism, drug addiction, crimes 
of violence and so forth. In philosophy, likewise, since Adams's death the 
existentialist Absurd (the term borrowed from Kierkegaard) as the basis of 
life (reflected in many aspects of art, music, drama, fiction and poetry) 
might well lend credibility to Adams's general theory for all those not p re -
pared to follow Kierkegaard's leap beyond reason into faith. Instead of 
ignoring or scorning pessimistic prophets like Adams and Spengler, we 
should take seriously their dire predictions, which are based on a most 
convincing array of accurate data, and do all that is humanly possible 
(invoking also divine assistance) to prevent these predictions from coming 
true. The decline is certainly here; perhaps the fall may be averted. 
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